Several issues were raised by the analysis of the set of examples of measures of effect available to the author. Because their solution implied design decisions in the representation which should be documented, in the following sections we will present these issues and discuss how they were solved.
In the examples of MOEs we have available, one rather different type of MOE is the one that states that the enemy is forced to do something -- generally use a back-up or secondary system. The following are the examples found in the IFD-4 scenario plan:
Force use of more vulnerable back-up modes of comm Force erroneous decision due to mis-information Force use of back-up information transfer systems Force use of more vulnerable transmission systems Force collections via back-up modes Force use of back-up modes of comm Force use of back-up comm nodes
While this looks like a reasonable way to measure the effectiveness of an objective/task, several questions remain in our view. These MOEs can have (at least) two meanings. Let's take the first MOE in the list above as an example. The first meaning for it is that the original (non back-up) systems were enough destroyed that cannot be used anymore. The second meaning is that the back-up systems were used -- perhaps only once. (A third meaning is: both of the above). The difference may be crucial from the point of view of INTEL. For example, it may be that the backup systems are being used together with (part of) the main systems. A situation like this looks like it would fit the MOE, but is it really what is meant? Or is it meant, for example, that back-up systems are being used exclusively, or perhaps only more than main systems?
It was decided that these objectives are going to be reformulated to fit in to the present representation, because they are imprecise. The design decision was not to change the representation in order to accommodate a new format of MOEs.
Some of the MOEs of this type will be made into objectives, for example the MOE ``Force erroneous decision due to mis-information''. Others will probably be expressed in terms of a reduction in the number of main (non back-up) equipment/systems/modes and/or the number of back-up equipment/systems/nodes used as an effect of the objective.
MOEs may contain what looks like the specification of another objective or task subordinated to the original objective. The example from IFD-4 is:
Objective: Support GCC scheme of maneuver
MOE: Prep the Battlefield for Future Friendly Operations
This case seems to be relatively clear cut; we don't see how this can be considered as measuring whether GCC's scheme of maneuver was supported, but rather saying what tasks (lower-level objectives) are to be done to accomplish it. The other MOE for this objective (Use CAS to Enable Friendly Ground Scheme of Maneuver) seems to support this interpretation, since it also looks a bit like a task by itself -- notice the ``enable'' verb used. In this case, CAS may be in reality a means not to accomplish the air objective ``Support GCC scheme of maneuver'', but the implicit air task ``Enable Friendly Ground Scheme of Maneuver''.
This MOE is indeed an objective. The design decision is not to alter the representation to accommodate this case.
Remaining related questions:
In the list of example, five verbs were used: reduce, degrade, decrease, limit and delay. While delay has clearly a different meaning, the other four verbs seem to be used in the same sense, which is to lower the value of something. Further, limit was used in only one MOE: ``Limit ability for troop movement on primary LOCs by 35%''. Are these verbs really different when used in MOEs? Would it be a viable option to simplify the grammar to adopt only one or a few of them?
It was decided to limit the set of verbs to two: reduce and degrade. Reduce is usually used in connection with a capability, while degrade usually refers to an action. However, this usage will not be enforced by the representation. The two remaining verbs are eliminated, and their appearances are going to be substituted by reduce. The design decision is not to include the two verbs ( limit and decrease) in the grammar.
Current MOEs are written as a single sentence. However, one of the consequences is that the quantification may be scattered around the phrase, e.g., ``Degrade NCA Communications links by 50%''. It would be better to keep these elements together, making the MOE less a sentence and more a structure. For instance, the MOE above would be written ``NCA Communications links -- Degrade by 50%''.
It was decided to break in two parts instead of keeping it as a single English sentence. This format has already been used in exercises by Major Alred, and it seems to yield good results.
In current MOEs, the verbs are usually in the present tense. This is somewhat a consequence of the fact that they are written before the campaign, when the objectives are going to be achieved in the future. However, particularly when putting the verb in the end as in the format proposed, it may be better to use a language that describes a state instead of a goal. For instance, to write ``decrease by 30%'' has a strong flavor of an objective, while ``decreased by 30%'' indicates the effect of achieving the objective, that is, a state in which the objective has been achieved. Further, the fact that verbs (degrade, limit, etc.) are being use can raise the suspicion that the MOEs that use them are in fact objectives in disguise. However, we believe that they are just a different way to phrase the effect. For example, one can read ``Degrade NCA Communications links by 50%'' as ``NCA Communications links degraded by 50%''.
The form adopted for the verbs was the past tense. It helps avoiding the confusion of objectives and MOEs (which can be caused if they use similar sentence forms with verbs in the imperative form).
Frequently, ``No'' is used in the examples of MOE available to mean the value zero in some countable quantification. For example. ``No loss of Allied Aircraft to Libyan surface or air forces'' means that the event ``loss of Allied Aircraft to Libyan surface or air'' (measurable element) should occur zero times (quantification). Is this the correct interpretation?
It was adopted to allow either ``Zero'' or ``None'' as a possible value. ``No'' was not used because of it does not read well in the structure adopted for the MOE (two parts instead of one sentence).
We have found that several MOEs contain a direct or indirect specification of the means the planner wishes to use in accomplishing the objective. Indeed, sometimes the MOE contains a disguised form of such specification, with no actual measurement of when we can consider the objective achieved. Consider the following examples, from the plan used in the IFD-4:
Use PSYOPS techniques Use CAS to Enable Friendly Ground Scheme of Maneuver Exploit SOF Intelligence Exploit SOF Targeting Inputs Use of CAS to enable ground scheme of maneuver
These MOEs do not define a way to measure the accomplishment or progress in the execution of the objective. Instead, they define an additional piece of the objective, which is the definition of how -- that is, by which means -- is the objective to be accomplished. This information currently has no adequate place to go, which is likely to be the reason why they ended up in the measures of effect.
It is interesting to notice that the examples above refer to either a special asset or method (PSYOPS, Special forces) or a type of operation that is seen as a whole to be an asset by itself (combat air support, CAS). The examples do not refer to the ``usual'' assets, like aircraft or traditional weapons. We suppose this occurs because it is always assumed the objectives (which in the case are all force application objectives) will employ aircraft and related weapons. The need to specify that, say, an objective is to be accomplished using PSYOPS seems to appear because the assumed default was not valid.
We will add a new slot to the specification of air campaign objectives
(NOT to the measures of merit). This slot, called SPECIAL
MEANS,
is optional, and filled by one or more of a small number of fillers
that represent non-traditional force application means. Known fillers
are: SOF (which is the same as special forces or
special operation forces), SOF Intelligence, SOF
Targeting Inputs, CAS, and PSYOPS.
Consider the following objective and its measure of effect:
Objective: Destroy fleeting targets
MOE: Strike Targets Designated by unconventional forces within 12 hours
The first question is, is the objective above accomplished if its MOE is true (that is, if targets are indeed struck within 12 hours)? Or is this just a measure of the efficiency with which the objective is accomplished? In one case the measure of merit determine what it means for the objective to be accomplished. In the other, it determines how well (how fast, how precisely, etc.) it should be accomplished.
It is important to represent measures of efficiency, but these are really different from MOEs. The example is more a guidance than a measure of effect or effectiveness, and should be restated or eliminated. A possible rephrasing in a genuine MOE could be ``Nominated targets -- Reduce by 90%''.
In a related issue, many of these examples come from objectives that were nominated from other forces, and about which not much is known at planning time. Checkmate proposed that a good practice with respect to these objectives is to either find the missing information and define specific tasks for them, or not to decompose them altogether. An attempt to decompose these objectives into tasks without proper detailed knowledge can lead to problems such as the ones we pointed out in the measures of effect.
Consider the following MOEs:
Mediterranean remain free for commercial shipping Freedom of air movement over the battlespace
These MOEs represent states directly, that is, they mean that the effect of the objective is that (taking the second MOE as an example) there is freedom of movement in the battlespace. The problem with these definitions is that states are not measured very easily, at least not directly. For instance, what exactly is meant by ``freedom'' in the second MOE? Is it enough that there is no engagement, or is it necessary that these engagements do not represent a real threat (e.g., because they are not coordinated)? It seems that while the state ``freedom of air movement'' accurately describes the effect intended by the objective it is attached to, it is not really measurable. It would be more reasonable to establish quantified (indirect) measures of what this freedom is, e.g., ``no engagement during day time''.
These are indeed effects, not measures of effect. These objectives can and should be rephrased into the proposed representation, in terms of measurable elements.
Frequently, the MOE omits the reference value, such as in ``Degrade NCA Communications links by 50%''. In other words, it is not clear (or at least explicit) which is the initial value of the NCA communication links that is the basis of comparison for the 50%. However, this may be clear in the context if we assume that the basis of comparison is the value at the beginning of the conflict. The question is, should we enforce an initial value or not? An option to make this more palatable is to assume a default value such as ``pre-conflict levels''.
It was adopted the option of using a default value ``pre-conflict levels'', and further, allow the specification of reference values in terms of a date: ``known by date'', or ``current as of date''. The default for date will be the date in which the plan is produced.
All the MOEs we have found use a specific value, mostly Zero (the same thing as ``No''), like in ``No Libyan aircraft deliver weapons against allied forces''. However, it can be an interesting idea to use a value restriction (minimum/at least, maximum/at-most), like: ``At most three weapons deliveries by aircraft against allied forces'' or ``At most 10% reduction of Friendly shipping due to Enemy naval vessels''. While I can easily understand why in most of the cases the value is Zero, objectives with restrictions instead of hard values may be more realistic. For example, it may be the case that an objective did not fail after all only because there was one single ``loss of friendly air forces''? In other words, it makes sense to use hard limits sometimes, but the option of using a more flexible definition can be attractive too.
It was adopted the option of specifying MOE quantifications with value restrictions (at most, at least).