Return-Path: Received: from nitro.isi.edu (nitro.isi.edu [128.9.208.207]) by tonga.isi.edu (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id JAA23371 for ; Wed, 17 Apr 2002 09:14:46 -0700 (PDT) Received: from tnt.isi.edu (tnt.isi.edu [128.9.128.128]) by nitro.isi.edu (8.11.6/8.11.2) with ESMTP id g3HGEhA09346; Wed, 17 Apr 2002 09:14:43 -0700 (PDT) Received: from Labrea.AI.SRI.COM (Labrea.AI.SRI.COM [130.107.64.124]) by tnt.isi.edu (8.11.6/8.11.2) with ESMTP id g3HGEgp24765; Wed, 17 Apr 2002 09:14:42 -0700 (PDT) Received: from labrea (Labrea.AI.SRI.COM [130.107.64.124]) by Labrea.AI.SRI.COM (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id JAA22293; Wed, 17 Apr 2002 09:13:04 -0700 (PDT) Received: with LISTAR (v1.0.0; list rkf-tkcp); Wed, 17 Apr 2002 09:13:03 %z (PDT) Received: from imo-r02.mx.aol.com (imo-r02.mx.aol.com [152.163.225.98]) by Seacliff.AI.SRI.COM (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id JAA17495 for ; Wed, 17 Apr 2002 09:09:11 -0700 (PDT) From: COtstott@aol.com Received: from COtstott@aol.com by imo-r02.mx.aol.com (mail_out_v32.5.) id k.142.d0f41c2 (4239); Wed, 17 Apr 2002 12:08:26 -0400 (EDT) Message-ID: <142.d0f41c2.29eef7f9@aol.com> Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2002 12:08:25 EDT Subject: [rkf-tkcp] Response to "Critiques for the blue attack COAs" To: blythe@venera.isi.edu, rkf-tkcp@ai.sri.com CC: COtstott@aol.com MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="part1_142.d0f41c2.29eef7f9_boundary" X-Mailer: AOL 7.0 for Windows US sub 256 X-archive-position: 1304 X-listar-version: Listar v1.0.0 Sender: rkf-tkcp-bounce@ai.sri.com Errors-to: rkf-tkcp-bounce@ai.sri.com X-original-sender: COtstott@aol.com Precedence: bulk Reply-to: COtstott@aol.com X-list: rkf-tkcp X-UIDL: 902c22bc79f62251382b37ce94c70982 --part1_142.d0f41c2.29eef7f9_boundary Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Jim and Jihie: Here are my responses to your questions in ***red***. Charley Subj: Critiques for the blue attack COAs Date: 4/16/2002 7:20:21 PM Eastern Daylight Time From: blythe@ISI.EDU To: rkf-tkcp@ai.sri.com, COtstott@aol.com Sent from the Internet (Details) Charley, The COAs and their critiques that you've prepared for this scenario are highly informative - thanks. We again looked at how these critiques, or an approximation, might be generated automatically. Your feedback on the critiques for Dadmamian swamp was quite encouraging, so we'd like to continue this line and ask for your opinions on these. thanks, Jim and Jihie Mission accomplishment ---------------------- Mission: Seizure of Obj JAYHAWK and destruction of 29th Guards As in the Damamian Swamp scenario, we may use expected effects of the COA and check the results from a normative simulation or detailed simulation, including the location of the units and their remaining strength. - Remaining strength o RED: destroyed ***The term "destroyed" can have several definitions. To destroy an aircraft or a tank is fairly simple and objective. To destroy a military formation is quite another thing, and is subject to some subjectivity. The UMass folks and I talked about thi on my recent trip to Amherst and we talked about the differences between "Neutralize', "defeat" and "destroy". I think it is fairly safe to say that an enemy force has been "destroyed" when it has sustained casualties of between half and 80% of its strength---some might say simply "...greater than 50% casualties..."*** o BLUE: ;; SME may specify the expected strength after the attack***I suppose that an SME could do this, but it would be nice to have some sort of simulation engine that could run several iterartions of the fight and provide some sort of quantification of loss rates or loss exchange ratios.*** - Location of units o BLUE: are they now at JAYHAWK?***Yes, at the end of the directed action in either COA, most of our maneuver elements would be on, or south and southeast of Obj Jayhawk. I tried not to insert too many details such as assigning pieces of Jayhawk to each of the attacking brigades, but that would be necessary in an actual situation. A commander would probably divide Jayhawk into two brigade objectives, so the brigades would not intermingle on the final objective and commit any fratricide.*** Speed ----- We may retrieve the path/route of the moving operations involved in the COAs and check if the units can traverse the path quickly. We may also compare the overall time taken to accomplish the mission.***I think this would be fair. The main attack in COA#1 moves cross-country and on secondary roads. The main attack in COA #2 can begin using the main north-south highway on Axis Green, but they will fairly quickly have to deploy out of column formation on the road and move into a more suitable attack formation before meeting the security forces represented by the mechanized battalion that stands between them and JAYHAWK. This attack should move faster before the objective is reached, but will move more slowly through the enemy forces on the objective because it is a fronatl attack or penetration attack into the enemy's strength. COA#!, on the other hand, attacks into the enemy's flank and rear and will move faster after contact is gained (direct fire engagements) with the defensive forces on JAYHAWK. I would expect COA#1 to take less time overall.*** Simplicity ---------- One simple check we can do is comparing the number of different tasks assigned to the units. We may also check the degree of connections/coordination among the tasks. For example, in COA #2 the coordination of close fight, fires and aviation in the main attack may require relatively complex links among the tasks.***These all seem like very reasonable measurements to me.*** Use of terrain -------------- If we can assume that terrain features are known, we can show how they are used in the tasks. ***Except for the lake which shapes our courses of action in the early stages of the operation, the terrain is relatively simple and uninteresting in this fight. The Dadmamian Swamp may be a better lab for getting these measurements.***We are not sure how we can check for the 'lateral movement' of the battalion. ***Time/distance factors may give some insights. The "brigade" must shift on a diagonal which takes his whole formation 10-20 KM west as he approaches the objective area in order to add his combat power to the main attack formation. Since the force ratio is about even without him, two of ours against two Red units in the first ecehlon of the defense on JAYHAWK, his presence and participation is critical in the main attack force. He will probably arrive after the fight has already begun and can be used to "reinforce success" in a specific sector of the main attack.***Perhaps this can be done by the geo/spatial reasoner, or it may be the case that noting when a unit switches from one axis to another is adequate.***As above, both are important.*** Fire support: ------------- We can look at the tasks fire support is involved in in each COA: COA 1: Aviation artillery will attack deep initially on red artillery while main attack is moving. ***Attack helicopters could probably reduce the already attrited Red artillery to about half or less of its present strength, thus reducing the casualties on the Blue ground forces from enemy artiillery. There would undoubtedly be losses of the Blue Apaches in such an attack. In COA#2, I chose to hold the Apaches out of the deep attck to assisit in getting the ground elements through the fight where there is a more balanced force ration in the early going. Use of the Apaches in support of the main attack on Axis Green should insure its success.***Aviation artillery in support of main attack troops in contact.***"Aviation Artillery" is not a good term. WE are talking about precision fires from HellFire anti-tank missiles, and 30mm "electric gatling guns" that destroy artillery pieces, lightly-armored vehicles and heavily-armored vehicles with aimed fire.*** COA 2: Support main attack initially. On order, destroy retreating enemy forces in deep battle area. If the system were simply to count the artillery tasks, the two COAs appear to make equal use of the artillery. Is there an approach by which we can tell that the two tasks in COA1 (attack red artillery & support main attack) make better use of the artillery than the two tasks in COA2 (support main attack & destroy retreating forces)?***See the discussion above. It is a judgement call on my part that more combat power will be needed on the close battle on COA#2 than will be needed in COA#1. I did not send the Apaches after the artillery after the initial phase of COA#2 because I expect that they will be some of the fleeing elements after the two or three brigades roar onto JAYHAWK in this COA. The Apaches will find the artillery and destroy it as they hunt the fleeeing elements. The artillery must displace to the rear as the battle approaches, and anything moving to the north from the opbjective area will look like it is fleeing to the Apache drivers. If they are highly disciplined Red force elements, they will stop in firing positions, face to the south, and continue to support thre battle as long as Red forces are engaging the Blue attackers.*** Risk: -------- As well as by using detailed simulation and summing up the other features, as you mentioned in your last message, it seems important to know when an attack is in the rear or in a flank as compared with head-on. This is explicitly mentioned in the commander's intent in COA 1, and it would be simple to check if it was always explicitly mentioned when present. Is this a reasonable thing to expect? If not, it might be computable from the sketch, by looking at the angles of approach and the way that the enemy forces are arrayed, but this seems harder.***Both are acceptable. The sketch is meant to portray this attribute of the COA#1 very clearly, and should not be hard to discern.*** As well as attacking in the flank or the rear, the concept of 'enveloping' the enemy seems important here, and this may be easier to detect at least in that the attack comes from several different angles. ***Great advantage is achieved by attcking the flank or rear of enemy forces. It usually combines the advantages of surprise and positional advantage, plus it tends to spread panic in the enemy forces, making their defeat easier.*** Position from follow-on operations ---------------------------------- We are not sure how we could arrive at the prediction that the 2nd brigade arrives intact in COA 1, while the reserve forces may have to assist in the main effort in COA 2. Could this be inferred from the fact that more forces may be required to mount the direct attack? ***Yes, that was my idea, anyway. The flank attack advantages mentioned above will probably allow the 2nd Brigade to fight only minimally to achive overall success. That is why I think it will be positioned to "continue the attack north".*** There does not seem to be an explicit mention of the extra task in the reserve statement.***An oversight on my part.*** Not mentioned: force protection/ratios***I tried to keep it simple, so that you could look at comparable sized units and not worry too much about exact force ratios. Do you need me to be more explicit and define unit strengths or relaitive combat power? I can do that, but it requires longer and I have to go find some reference material.*** ---------------------------------------- Presumably the task force ratios are important to determine the risks involved in the two COAs. However, it seems that more information is needed to determine them. For example, what kind of tanks are used by the 29th Guards, eg Abrams, M60 or T62/64/../80?***These are very appropriate questions, but I have to ask how much detail you are looking for? Would it make a difference to you if it were T80s against Abrams or if it were M60s against T64s? If it does, I can add those organizational details to the scenario. I noticed that Schmitt was very vague about the enemy forces in his scenarios, so I emulated that level of detail in mine.*** List of relevant criteria ------------------------- As was discussed in the telecon, can we start to develop a set of critique criteria, at least for the CP? We might be able to divide them into two sets: those that are used frequently, like mission accomplishment, use of terrain and risk, and those that appear less frequently but still often enough to be of general use, like perhaps speed and position for follow-on operations. Given these, one viable approach might be for a user to select the criteria of interest in a given situation. Another might be to always include the core criteria, and append any of the less frequent criteria whose values differ across the COAs under consideration.***I like the idea of core or default criteria, and some frequently used ones on a pull down menu with an authoring tool that comes up under "other criteria" if needed.*** --part1_142.d0f41c2.29eef7f9_boundary Content-Type: text/html; charset="US-ASCII" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Jim and Jihie:

Here are my responses to your questions in ***red***.

Charley

Subj: Critiques for the blue attack COAs
Date: 4/16/2002 7:20:21 PM Eastern Daylight Time
From: blythe@ISI.EDU
To: rkf-tkcp@ai.sri.com, COtstott@aol.com
Sent from the Internet (Details)

Charley,

The COAs and their critiques that you've prepared for this scenario are
highly informative - thanks. We again looked at how these critiques, or
an approximation, might be generated automatically. Your feedback on the
critiques for Dadmamian swamp was quite encouraging, so we'd like to
continue this line and ask for your opinions on these.

thanks,
Jim and Jihie

Mission accomplishment
----------------------

Mission: Seizure of Obj JAYHAWK and destruction of 29th Guards

As in the Damamian Swamp scenario, we may use expected effects of the
COA and check the results from a normative simulation or detailed
simulation, including the location of the units and their remaining
strength.

- Remaining strength
o RED: destroyed ***The term "destroyed" can have several definitions. To destroy an aircraft or a tank is fairly simple and objective. To destroy a military formation is quite another thing, and is subject to some subjectivity. The UMass folks and I talked about thi on my recent trip to Amherst and we talked about the differences between "Neutralize', "defeat" and "destroy". I think it is fairly safe to say that an enemy force has been "destroyed" when it has sustained casualties of between half and 80% of its strength---some might say simply "...greater than 50% casualties..."***
o BLUE: ;; SME may specify the expected strength after the attack***I suppose that an SME could do this, but it would be nice to have some sort of simulation engine that could run several iterartions of the fight and provide some sort of quantification of loss rates or loss exchange ratios.***

- Location of units
o BLUE: are they now at JAYHAWK?***Yes, at the end of the directed action in either COA, most of our maneuver elements would be on, or south and southeast of Obj Jayhawk. I tried not to insert too many details such as assigning pieces of Jayhawk to each of the attacking brigades, but that would be necessary in an actual situation. A commander would probably divide Jayhawk into two brigade objectives, so the brigades would not intermingle on the final objective and commit any fratricide.***

Speed
-----

We may retrieve the path/route of the moving operations involved in the
COAs and check if the units can traverse the path quickly. We may also
compare the overall time taken to accomplish the mission.***I think this would be fair. The main attack in COA#1 moves cross-country and on secondary roads. The main attack in COA #2 can begin using the main north-south highway on Axis Green, but they will fairly quickly have to deploy out of column formation on the road and move into a more suitable attack formation before meeting the security forces represented by the mechanized battalion that stands between them and JAYHAWK. This attack should move faster before the objective is reached, but will move more slowly through the enemy forces on the objective because it is a fronatl attack or penetration attack into the enemy's strength. COA#!, on the other hand, attacks into the enemy's flank and rear and will move faster after contact is gained (direct fire engagements) with the defensive fo! rc! es on JAYHAWK. I would expect COA#1 to take less time overall.***

Simplicity
----------

One simple check we can do is comparing the number of different tasks
assigned to the units. We may also check the degree of
connections/coordination among the tasks. For example, in COA #2 the
coordination of close fight, fires and aviation in the main attack may
require relatively complex links among the tasks.***These all seem like very reasonable measurements to me.***

Use of terrain
--------------

If we can assume that terrain features are known, we can show how they
are used in the tasks. ***Except for the lake which shapes our courses of action in the early stages of the operation, the terrain is relatively simple and uninteresting in this fight. The Dadmamian Swamp may be a better lab for getting these measurements.***We are not sure how we can check for the
'lateral movement' of the battalion. ***Time/distance factors may give some insights. The "brigade" must shift on a diagonal which takes his whole formation 10-20 KM west as he approaches the objective area in order to add his combat power to the main attack formation. Since the force ratio is about even without him, two of ours against two Red units in the first ecehlon of the defense on JAYHAWK, his presence and participation is critical in the main attack force. He will probably arrive after the fight has already begun and can be used to "reinforce success" in a specific sector of the main attack.***Perhaps this can be done by the
geo/spatial reasoner, or it may be the case that noting when a unit
switches from one axis to another is adequate.***As above, both are important.***

Fire support:
-------------

We can look at the tasks fire support is involved in in each COA:

COA 1:

Aviation artillery will attack deep initially on red artillery while
main attack is moving. ***Attack helicopters could probably reduce the already attrited Red artillery to about half or less of its present strength, thus reducing the casualties on the Blue ground forces from enemy artiillery. There would undoubtedly be losses of the Blue Apaches in such an attack. In COA#2, I chose to hold the Apaches out of the deep attck to assisit in getting the ground elements through the fight where there is a more balanced force ration in the early going. Use of the Apaches in support of the main attack on Axis Green should insure its success.***Aviation artillery in support of main attack
troops in contact.***"Aviation Artillery" is not a good term. WE are talking about precision fires from HellFire anti-tank missiles, and 30mm "electric gatling guns" that destroy artillery pieces, lightly-armored vehicles and heavily-armored vehicles with aimed fire.***

COA 2:

Support main attack initially. On order, destroy retreating enemy forces
in deep battle area.

If the system were simply to count the artillery tasks, the two COAs
appear to make equal use of the artillery. Is there an approach by
which we can tell that the two tasks in COA1 (attack red artillery &
support main attack) make better use of the artillery than the two tasks
in COA2 (support main attack & destroy retreating forces)?***See the discussion above. It is a judgement call on my part that more combat power will be needed on the close battle on COA#2 than will be needed in COA#1. I did not send the Apaches after the artillery after the initial phase of COA#2 because I expect that they will be some of the fleeing elements after the two or three brigades roar onto JAYHAWK in this COA. The Apaches will find the artillery and destroy it as they hunt the fleeeing elements. The artillery must displace to the rear as the battle approaches, and anything moving to the north from the opbjective area will look like it is fleeing to the Apache drivers. If they are highly disciplined Red force elements, they will stop in firing positions, face to the south, and continue to support thre battle as long as Re! d ! forces are engaging the Blue attackers.***

Risk:
--------

As well as by using detailed simulation and summing up the other
features, as you mentioned in your last message, it seems important to
know when an attack is in the rear or in a flank as compared with
head-on. This is explicitly mentioned in the commander's intent in COA
1, and it would be simple to check if it was always explicitly mentioned
when present. Is this a reasonable thing to expect? If not, it might be
computable from the sketch, by looking at the angles of approach and the
way that the enemy forces are arrayed, but this seems harder.***Both are acceptable. The sketch is meant to portray this attribute of the COA#1 very clearly, and should not be hard to discern.***

As well as attacking in the flank or the rear, the concept of
'enveloping' the enemy seems important here, and this may be easier to
detect at least in that the attack comes from several different angles.***Great advantage is achieved by attcking the flank or rear of enemy forces. It usually combines the advantages of surprise and positional advantage, plus it tends to spread panic in the enemy forces, making their defeat easier.***

Position from follow-on operations
----------------------------------

We are not sure how we could arrive at the prediction that the 2nd
brigade arrives intact in COA 1, while the reserve forces may have to
assist in the main effort in COA 2. Could this be inferred from the fact
that more forces may be required to mount the direct attack? ***Yes, that was my idea, anyway. The flank attack advantages mentioned above will probably allow the 2nd Brigade to fight only minimally to achive overall success. That is why I think it will be positioned to "continue the attack north".***There does
not seem to be an explicit mention of the extra task in the reserve
statement.***An oversight on my part.***

Not mentioned: force protection/ratios***I tried to keep it simple, so that you could look at comparable sized units and not worry too much about exact force ratios. Do you need me to be more explicit and define unit strengths or relaitive combat power? I can do that, but it requires longer and I have to go find some reference material.***
----------------------------------------

Presumably the task force ratios are important to determine the risks
involved in the two COAs. However, it seems that more information is
needed to determine them. For example, what kind of tanks are used by
the 29th Guards, eg Abrams, M60 or T62/64/../80?***These are very appropriate questions, but I have to ask how much detail you are looking for? Would it make a difference to you if it were T80s against Abrams or if it were M60s against T64s? If it does, I can add those organizational details to the scenario. I noticed that Schmitt was very vague about the enemy forces in his scenarios, so I emulated that level of detail in mine.***

List of relevant criteria
-------------------------

As was discussed in the telecon, can we start to develop a set of
critique criteria, at least for the CP? We might be able to divide them
into two sets: those that are used frequently, like mission
accomplishment, use of terrain and risk, and those that appear less
frequently but still often enough to be of general use, like perhaps
speed and position for follow-on operations. Given these, one viable
approach might be for a user to select the criteria of interest in a
given situation. Another might be to always include the core criteria,
and append any of the less frequent criteria whose values differ across
the COAs under consideration.***I like the idea of core or default criteria, and some frequently used ones on a pull down menu with an authoring tool that comes up under "other criteria" if needed.***

--part1_142.d0f41c2.29eef7f9_boundary--