>Dan: This paragraph is too long. This is a document about subnets, not
>applications. To the extent subnet designers are ignorant about these things,
>it also creates false expectations about widespread deployment and usage.
The whole purpose of this document is to educate the designers of
subnetworks about the Internet environment in which they are expected
to operate. I started this effort because I perceived many subnetwork
designers to be working in a vacuum. I therefore think it entirely
within scope to enumerate the end-to-end security mechanisms that are
already available in the Internet architecture to help the subnetwork
designer decide the importance of providing similar features.
This is *exactly* analogous to the discussion of how the end-to-end
reliability provided by Internet transport protocols obviates the need
for "total" reliability in a subnetwork. Otherwise we have unnecessary
duplication of function.
>Dan: > Since when does the IETF have majorities and minorities!!! Did we
>take a vote ;-)? This is an extremely prejudicial statement. The previous
Quite frankly, Dan, I'm being quite charitable here. The "minority"
consists of one person: you. Otherwise it would have been a clear
consensus. And you didn't even show up in London to make your case; I
had to make it for you as best I could, and I am still trying to
present both points of view in the document as best I can.
I'm still digesting your substitute text. I may put it in just to get
this over with.
Nevertheless, I suspect you will never be satisfied with the result,
so all I can suggest at this point is that you document your point of
view in your own document and publish it as an informational RFC with
your name on it.
[section on traffic analysis]
>What does this add? Suggest removing this paragraph.
You weren't in London, so you missed the discussion about the utility of
subnetwork security to thwart traffic analysis. I suggested, and the group
agreed, to add language addressing this point with the caveat that traffic
analysis is a very difficult and subtle threat.
Phil
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Mon Jan 28 2002 - 09:12:29 EST