

Information Sciences Institute



Running Live Self-Propagating Malware on the DETER Testbed

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- **Facilitate scientific experimentation**
- **Establish baseline for validation of new approaches**
- **To protect the public internet from the side effects of security experiments**
 - Saturated Links
 - Broken routing
 - **Exfiltration of malicious code**
- **Provide access to wide community of users**


- **Goals of Experiment**
- **Testbed Procedures**
- **Running the experiment**
- **Results and lessons learned**
- **Future experimentation**
- **Future of Malware on DETER**

- **Exercise procedures for containment**
 - While using malicious code that would be relatively innocuous if our procedures failed.
 - We will exercise the procedures as if the code is more dangerous than it actually is.
- **Generate useful results**
 - Traces that can be used by other experimenters.
- **Improve procedures to improve future experiments by others.**


- **Full containment is very restrictive**
 - Requires physical access to manage and run.
 - Can not run other experiments simultaneously.
- **Longer term goal is to allow some malware experiments to run while connected.**
 - Procedures developed and tested requiring strongest containment.
 - For particular pieces of known malware, individual procedures may be eliminated or modified.

- **Up front one time steps to secure the testbed**
 - Collect BIOS and OS checksums
 - Disable writing of BIOS
 - Intrusion detection running on control network and inside severed connection to the outside.
- **Per experiment steps**
 - Backup user and boss and power down backup
 - Power down unused assets
 - Disconnect from outside and power down connection
 - Regression test that no packets escape


DETER Architecture




Backup User/Boss




Disconnect Intercluster



Placement of ID devices



Move user inside, Run Regression



- **Experiment staged sans malware before disconnecting**
 - Nodes swapped in
 - Data collection tested
- **Testbed disconnected and worm introduced**
 - TCPdump and Tethereal used to collect traces
 - Traces transferred to a single experiment node and written to a USB disk which is then disconnected

- **The Scalper experiment**
 - Current configuration was only 4 nodes
 - Started with 52, but because testbed was needed by others we scaled it down to get it working.
 - Now that meeting is complete we can schedule downtime again to collect larger traces.
 - Post processing in progress off-line, removing worm code from traces.
 - Traces from larger experiment will be available to DETER researchers.

- **Experiment nodes zeroed**
- **BIOS checksums & tripwire checked**
 - Users and BOSS
- **ID device logs checked**
 - Looking for unexpected communication to users and Boss
 - Any unexpected communications to external firewall
 - Physically disconnected, but indicates failure of internal containment.
 - Power to disabled assets
 - Reconnect testbed to outside

- **Malware is more sensitive to environment than expected at first.**
 - Advanced testing sans malware not enough.
 - It still took us 4 attempts with associated testbed downtime to get the worm to propoagate.
 - Solution: Stage sans malware connected (as we did) plus test with malware on single node using vmware and on mini-bed, before running on full testbed.
- **Missing testbed features**
 - Honeynet module mapping nodes to dynamically detected target addresses.

- **Two phase modeling**
 - Experimenter should be able to order traces from a catalog of malware, specifying topology details, and what trace details need preservation.
 - Traces generated, scrubbed, and made available for use by investigator.
- **Questions to be answered**
 - Can background traffic be mixed with traces, or must it be present when trace generated.
 - Will likely depend on the malware used
 - What kind of experiments is this useful for
 - Probably detection experiments, but less useful where there is two way interaction between studied protocol/device and the worm.

- **Development of mini-beds will allow small malware experiments concurrent with other use of testbed.**
 - Malware experiments also tested on smaller topologies to work out the bugs before introducing to larger testbed.
- **Federation of Testbed for Malware experiments**
 - For less dangerous malware
- **Addition of Honeynet features.**
 - This will support study of binary worms where scanning behavior can not be predicted.
- **Development of a catalog of Malware**
 - With a list of specific containment features needed for each.