

### Independent Functional Testing of Commercial FPGA Devices



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### Outline

- SURE Center Overview
- FPGA Functional Testing Problem
- Overview of IFT Tool





SecUre and Robust Electronics (SURE) Center Mission

- Raise societal and commercial awareness of the importance of Hardware Security and Robustness issues
- Contribute to advancing US leadership in Hardware Security and Robustness
- Advance the scale, pace, and impact of hardware robustness and security technology development

Establish a national center of excellence for Secure, Robust Electronics that advances national security and national capabilities








# **SURE Center Theme**

- Effective hardware needs to be Trustable, Secure, Resilient, and Reliable
  - "It just needs to work"

Information Sciences Institute

- Trust: Does it work as expected?
- Security: Can it be hacked? Counterfeited?
- Resilience: Is it error tolerant?
- **Reliability:** Does it wear out prematurely?




Effective Hardware: Trustable, Secure, Resilient, and Reliable

• Problem: Inherent complexities within state of the art electronics have significantly compromised <u>all four areas</u>



# \$70M, One Decade of Investment



#### \$70M to date since 2004, robust across CS&T and DE divisions


- DARPA Expose First program to investigate developing 3D chip inspection techniques using high resolution xray tomography
- DARPA TAG Trust in Integrated circuit program Black Hat team which developed Benchmark hardware trojans and analysis of white hat capabilities
- AFRL SPAOA Consulted with AFRL on the development of a level 5 Secure Processor
- DARPA TERCI Investigating novel methods for efficient detection of reliability tampering with ICs
- DARPA ITAG Black hat team for DARPA IRIS program which developed integrity and reliability hardware trojans; Also researching FPGA functional discovery techniques

- IARPA TIC Investigating use of foreign SOA Fabs to develop "secure" Ics via the paradigm of "split-manufacturing"
- IARPA SAFIRE Investigating novel anti-tamper methods for FPGA devices
- AFRL CNWL Investigating control of EM emissions from commercial devices
- DARPA HAVoC Adversarial Challenge team for FPGA firmware security vetting
- NASA RHINO, FTS-3, and A-OPSS Investigating Radiation Hardening by Software techniques for FPGAs, including hard IP
- DTRA RadMAC Application of residue coding theory for low overhead error detection & correction



# **SURE and MOSIS**





- Performs research and development in hardware Trust, Security, Reliability, and Resiliency
- Operates as a designated center within ISI
- Provides low cost access to modern foundry nodes through shared mask, wafer, and foundry and packager interface
- Operates as a non-profit service center within ISI



### **Tech Transition Pipeline**



#### **Split Fabrication**


IARPA Trusted Integrated Chips (TIC) Program

#### Approach:


 The IARPA TIC program was established to access the best world-class semiconductor manufacturing capabilities through a concept know as split-manufacturing whereby CMOS transistors are produced at an off-shore (FEOL) foundry followed by the deposition of backend metallization layers (BEOL) in a US manufacturing facility.

#### Challenges:


- Engaging foundries as a low volume potential customer
- Merging PDKs from different foundries
- Heterogeneous integration ("More-than-Moore")



#### **Reliability Assessment**







#### Interconnect Testing

Custom massively replicatable paths to exercise PIPs: one signal exiting to left and another signal arriving from right, passing through PIPs Flip-flop on right enables launch and capture of test signals through logic




# **FPGA Independent Test Overview**



#### • Why Independent test?

- FPGA vendors perform extensive functional testing during production
- But what about
  - Trusted supply chain verification
  - Devices acquired from deep storage
  - Determining health of fielded systems
- Problem:
  - FPGA architectures are large (~1 billion transistors), complex, and largely opaque to end users
  - ATPG is intractable device size causes state space explosion







- IFT Methodology:
  - Combine ISI's exhaustive knowledge of FPGA device architecture with internally developed APIs and tools which exposes all configurable resources to exhaustively quantify and test all FPGA features
  - Leverages tools developed under DARPA Trust and IRIS programs
  - Provide coverage metrics
- IFT queries and programs all elements on a device for testing
  - FPGA may be mounted on PCB
  - Operates independently of
    - FPGA I/O pin utilization
    - Clocks or resets
  - Uses JTAG or SelectMAP for interface



# **IFT Approach**

- Simple stuck-at fault model utilized
  - Easily extensible for other fault models
- Testing approach by resource:
  - Configuration memory: write and read entire configuration memory
  - Logic: slices fully covered by 19 configurations
    - Additional logic types can be added
  - Interconnect: simultaneous launch and capture between pairs of logic sites for all tiles in clock region height
    - 200M mux / (50 mux/test) / (test/2.5µsec) ≈ 10 sec/device
- Real time execution
  - IFT leverages algorithms which exploit regularity, parallelism, and partial reconfiguration to realize a tractable, scalable testing solution



### **Logic: Slices**




| • Co | verage  | · |
|------|---|---|
| _    | Every path and every element in SLICEL and SLICEM in entire<br>device   |   |
|      | <ul> <li>LUTs, flip-flops, carry chains, configurable muxes, single- and<br/>dual-ported RAM and ROM</li> </ul> |   |
| • Gr | oups  |   |
| _    | LUTs  |   |
| _    | Combinational paths through AMUX/BMUX/CMUX/DMUX   |   |
| _    | Combinational paths through AF/BF/CF/DF muxes   | · |
| _    | SelectRAM (LUTs configured as RAM or ROM)   | · |
| _    | Shift registers   | · |
| _    | Vertical carry chains   |   |
| • Te | sting   |   |
| 1    | . Create paths that exercise every path in a SLICE  | • |
| 2    | <ul> <li>Recursively connect four SLICE outputs to four inputs of<br/>next SLICE</li> </ul>                     | • |
| 3    | <ul> <li>Chain through entire region under test (typically ½ – ¼ of device)</li> </ul>                          | · |
| 4    | <ul> <li>Controller launches signal at beginning of chain and<br/>captures result at end of chain</li> </ul>    | : |
|      |   | · |



# Routing

- Extends Slice launch and capture approach to routing wires
- Interconnect testing utilizes custom, massively replicatable paths to exercise user wires and routing multiplexers
- Up to 3,800 routing multiplexers verified in parallel



Interconnect Testing

Custom massively replicatable paths to exercise PIPs: one signal exiting to left and another signal arriving from right, passing through PIPs



### **IFT Summary**



- First known tools for Independent FPGA Functional Testing and coverage metrics
- Currently supports the Xilinx 7-Series architectures (Virtex7, Kintex7, Artix7, Zynq700).
  - Internal databases support all Virtex 1-7 devices. IFT can support other generations with one time port.
- **Coverage** on largest current Xilinx Virtex7 Zynq device (XC7X980T)
  - 100% Configuration memory cells covered
  - 95+% of wires (34,515,491) and routing multiplexers (378,563,268)
  - 100% of logic Slices covered
  - Wire and slice coverage corresponds to 90% of bitstream (3.7MB)
  - Test time << 2 hrs
  - Coverage limitations not reached.
- Future extensions
  - Additional logic types (BRAMs, DSPs, DCMs, EMACs ...)
  - Additional fault model types (bridging etc)

Independent testing for when we don't trust the supply chain, parts are of unknown origin/condition, or fielded parts become faulty




# **Tools for Open Reconfigurable Computing**



- What is it?
  - **Open-source C++ framework** for reconfigurable computing
  - Strategic capability for ISI, **resource** for research community
  - **Complements ISE** replaces/augments/constrains as needed
- What does it offer?
  - Complete EDIF, XDL, XDLRC (device architecture) support
  - Extensive **bitstream** support
  - Includes routing, placing, et cetera, in REAL devices
- Is it legal?
  - Built upon **non-proprietary**, publicly available information
  - Supports bitstream frames but **not** frame contents
- Who cares?
  - Researchers with special requirements unsupported by ISE
  - Researchers developing CAD algorithms for REAL devices



TOOLS FOR OPEN RECONFIGURABLE COMPUTING http://torc.isi.edu




**TORC Architecture** 



### Questions







### **Thank You!**





