To resolve this difficulty, we need to look at a third phenomenon from local pragmatics--metonymy. In
(23) |
I like to read Proust. |
(24) |
|
(25) |
We do not deal here with the very hard problem of just what relations can function as a coercion relation. In the right contexts it can be almost anything. However, as Pustejovsky (1992) argues, coercion relations very often involve causation--the Agentive and Telic qualia, in Pustejovsky's terms. Here we encode possible coercion relations explicitly in axioms such as (28) and (33).
For example (23) three axioms are required.
(26) |
|
(27) | |
(28) |
The interpretation of example (23) is then shown in Figure .
Grammatically subordinated material in sentences, such as adjectives modifying nouns, can sometimes carry the primary information of a sentence, and thus be its assertion. For example, in
(29) |
I have a sore throat. |
This example requires that both possession and soreness be possible coercion relations:
(30) |
|
(31) |
(32) |
Figure now shows the interpretation of example (29). The having e1 is taken as the eventuality conveyed by the verb phrase, but that is coerced into the soreness e2, using as a coercion relation a composite of the having and the soreness. We have not indicated what constraint forces this coercion, but it could be the newsworthiness constraint encoded in Axiom (16), or it could be the weaker constraint that what is said should simply be informative.
We now have the machinery we need for dealing with example (3). It can be seen as an instance of metonymy. Just as in example (29) we had to coerce from the having to the soreness, in example (3) we have to coerce from the happiness to the promotion. We need a relation linking them, but the causality provides just such a relation.
(33) |
(34) |
The pervasive phenomenon of metonymy provides exactly the solution we need to overcome the difficulty pinpointed in Figure . The complete (for this note) interpretation of example (3) is illustrated in Figure . The generalized Metonymy Axiom (34) resolves the conflict between the Explanation pattern (1) and the desideratum of Axiom (16) that an utterance convey newsworthy information; it is precisely the requirement of newsworthiness that forces metonymic interpretation to override the default given by Axiom (1). By Axiom (33) the causal relation between the promotion and the happiness provides the required coercion. That the same causal relation figures in the solutions to the coreference, coherence, and metonymy problems all at once is a virtue of the interpretation, because it is an instance of the exploitation of redundancy that leads to minimal abductive proofs.
Metonymy at the discourse level is a common phenomenon. For instance, Moore and Pollack (1992) provide an example that purports to show that the semantic and pragmatic structures of discourse can sometimes be at odds with each other:
(35) |
Come home by 5:00. Then we can go to the hardware store before it closes. That way we can finish the bookshelves tonight. |